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Abstract 
In England, across the whole period of the Great Debasement, the 
mint issued six different kinds of silver coins and three kinds of gold 
coins. According to Gresham’s Law, coins with the same face value 
but different intrinsic values can not circulate side by side for too 
long: only those coins with lower intrinsic values stay in circulation; 
those with relatively high intrinsic values would be hoarded, 
exported, or melted down. Neither contemporary sources nor 
modern research about the disappearance of good money over 
this period has provided any solid quantitative assessment of the 
effectiveness of Gresham’s Law. This paper intends to produce 
such an assessment. For this purpose, two types of evidence are 
examined: the composition of the re-coinage of 1560, and the trend 
of the exchange rate. The result shows that contrary to popular 
belief, Gresham’s Law was rather ineffective in 
mid-sixteenth-century England. 
 
 
Introduction 
Gresham’s Law is one of the most generally accepted and 
frequently cited propositions in discussions of commodity money, in which 
the intrinsic value often deviates from the nominal value given by the 
authority. The proposition that bad (overvalued) money drives out good 
(undervalued) money has been widely applied to explain the movement of 
bullion in the late Middle Ages. According to Gresham’s Law, the different 
gold-silver ratios among countries or regions would likely result in the 
influx of the overvalued metal and the outflow of the undervalued metal 
either though monetary arbitrage or the unbalanced international trade.1 
                                                 
1 Based on Gresham’s Law, bullion movement is generally accepted as the result of 
different gold-silver ratios among countries and regions. However, scholars have two 
different theories about how the mechanism of Gresham’s Law works: monetary 
 - 1 -
Apart from the movement of bullion, monetary alteration was another 
frequent experience in the late Middle Ages. Monetary alteration (often 
without recalling the old coins) resulted in various standards in circulating 
coins. Gresham’s Law can thus also be used to explain the problems and 
consequences cased by monetary disarray. However, this paper aims to 
discuss the validity of Gresham’s Law in the narrower term, the effect on 
the composition of domestic circulation, and argues that information is 
critical in the operation of Gresham’s Law. Therefore, the course of this 
paper is to examine the prerequisite for Gresham’s Law and to 
quantitatively assess the effectiveness of Gresham’s Law in the years 
1544-60.  
Although Thomas Gresham was mistakenly identified as the first to 
discover that “bad money drives good money out of circulation”,2 his 
lifetime, which coincided with a dramatic monetary event: the Great 
Debasement, an unprecedented deterioration in the English coinage, 
provides a great opportunity to explore this proposition. From 1544 to 
1551, a huge number of debased coins poured into the market, and this 
disorder in the coinage was not resolved until the Elizabethan re-coinage 
of 1560. Owing to its monstrous scale and far-reaching impact, the subject 
of the Great Debasement has attracted wide attention, but questions such 
                                                                                                                                               
arbitrage proposed by Watson, and commercial payment. A. M. Watson, ‘Back to Gold 
and Silver’, Economic History Review, Vol. 20, (1967), pp. 1-34. The critic of Watson’s 
theory see H. A. Miskimin, ‘The Enforcement of Gresham’s Law’, Cash, Credit and 
Crisis in Europe, 1300-1600 (Variorum, 1989), pp. 154-6; J. H. Munro, Wool, Cloth, and 
Gold (University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 29-32; idem., ‘Mint Policies, ratios, and 
Outputs in the Low Countries’, Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the 
Low Countries, 1350-1500 (Variorum, 1992), p. 76 and Appendix A. 
2 F. W. Fetter, ‘Some Neglected Aspects of Gresham’s Law’, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 46, No. 3, (1932), pp. 480-95. 
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as the extent to which the money market was affected by the debasement, 
and the validity of Gresham’s Law during this monetary turbulence have 
not been quantitatively assessed. The assessment of the efficacy of 
Gresham’s Law in the Great Debasement can not only shed some light on 
the impact of the debasement upon society, but also on the understanding 
of the movement of bullion due to changes in coinage. 
The paper is organized as follows: first, I summarize the recent 
literature on Gresham’s Law and discuss questions arising from the 
literature, and then employ an asymmetric information model to explain 
Gresham’s Law. Second, the historical context of this analysis will be 
presented: a series of debasements experienced in mid-Tudor England. 
Third, two ways of examining Gresham’s law are advanced: 1) the 
discrepancy between the quantities of fine silver coins in circulation on the 
eve of Elizabeth’s re-coinage and the total output of fine silver during 
1551-8; 2) the difference between the actual exchange rates and the par 
exchange rates of London-Antwerp during and after the Great 
Debasement. Finally, I draw the two types of evidence together and offer 
some conclusion on the efficacy of Gresham’s Law during the Great 
Debasement. 
 
 
Gresham’s Law 
Imagine in a commodity money economy, being a buyer you have 
two kinds of money: both have the same face value, but one (undervalued 
or good money) has a higher intrinsic value than the other (overvalued or 
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bad money). Which money will you hand to sellers in exchange for a 
certain amount of goods, if sellers will accept both equally? You will give 
up the bad money in exchange for the same amount of goods that can be 
obtained for the same quantity of good money. What will you do if sellers 
can draw a distinction between good and bad money, and set different 
prices for different monies? It is very likely that you are indifferent toward 
these two kinds of money when their respective intrinsic values are exactly 
reflected by their purchasing power. For example, if the metallic content of 
bad money is only four-fifths of good money, therefore the price paid in 
bad money has to be one-quarter higher than that paid in good money to 
enable both to command the same purchasing power. In this case good 
money can circulate side-by-side with bad money.  
The simple example above shows us that the validity of Gresham’s 
Law - bad (overvalued) money drives good (undervalued) money out of 
circulation - requires an important assumption, namely that some 
consumers are better informed than others. Therefore, well informed 
consumers can pass on bad money to less informed consumers and 
hoard good money. This so-called asymmetric information has been 
explored by economists in many economic fields: Akerlof linked it to the 
‘lemons’ problem, Chari to labour economics, Leland to licensing laws, Hill 
to securitized assets, and Gandal and Sussman to the emergence of 
national commodity money.3 Gresham’s Law could be regarded as an 
                                                 
3 G. A. Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3 (1970), pp. 488-500. V. 
V. Chari, ‘Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol.98, (1983), pp. 107-122; C. A. Hill, ‘Securitization: A Low-Cost 
Sweetener for Lemon’, Washington University Law Quarterly, 74 (1996), pp. 1061-1126; 
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application of the asymmetric information theory to the commodity money 
economy. 
Debates over Gresham’s Law have considered in what 
circumstances Gresham’s Law applies and how to explain the numerous 
cases where either bad and good money circulated side by side, or good 
money drove bad money out of circulation. Rolnick and Weber strongly 
argue that the transaction cost related to imposing a premium (or discount) 
on good (or bad) money is the underlying element in the success of 
Gresham’s Law.4 Undervalued large-denomination money could circulate 
at a premium while undervalued small-denomination money would 
disappear due to the high costs of paying the premium. Greenfield and 
Rockoff, after their re-examination of the same three examples provided 
by Rolnick and Weber, claim that there is no strong evidence to invalidate 
Gresham’s Law in nineteenth-century America and that bad money did 
indeed drive out good money.5 In contrast to Rolnick and Weber’s 
argument, Selgin, following the orthodox version of Gresham’s Law, 
claims that legal tender legislation is a prerequisite for Gresham’s Law.6 
Legal tender laws, “by making it costly or at least risky for sellers to 
communicate their monetary preference to buyers”,7 could completely 
                                                                                                                                               
H. Leland, ‘Quacks, Lemons and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards’, 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87, No. 6 (1979), pp. 1328-46; N. Gandal and N. 
Sussman, ‘Asymmetric Information and Commodity Money: Tickling the Tolerance in 
Medieval France’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1997), pp. 
440-457. 
4 A. J. Rolnick and W. E. Weber, ‘Gresham’s Law or Gresham’s Fallacy’, The Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 1, (1986), pp. 185-99. 
5 R. L. Greenfield and H. Rockoff, ‘Gresham’s Law in Nineteenth Century American’, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 27, No. 4, (1995), pp. 1086-98. 
6 G. Selgin, ‘Salvaging Gresham’s Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Illegal’, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 28, No. 4, (1996), pp. 637-49. 
7 Ibid., p. 641. 
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eliminate the possibility of discriminating in favour of any money. In a more 
theoretical discussion about the conditions under which Gresham’s Law 
holds true, Velde, Weber and Wright (hereafter VWW) establish a 
search-based model in which the exchange between well-informed and 
less-informed agents leads to by-weight and by-tale equilibria.8 Under the 
by-weight equilibrium, heavy coins are able to circulate among 
well-informed agents, while under the by-tale equilibrium, well-informed 
agents impose a premium on heavy coins, but less-informed agents 
indiscriminately accept heavy and light coins. As Volckart points out 
recently, whether consumers are a homogeneous group is a critical 
assumption underlying currency competition.9 Therefore, only when each 
party to the transaction possesses different knowledge about the quality of 
money, and the transaction cost assigning a discount or premium to the 
two kinds of money is not very high, bad money drives good money out of 
circulation.  
During debasement, the medium of exchange comprised two kinds 
of coins: those with the old standard fineness, and the debased. 
Gresham’s Law leads us to expect that the old standard coins would be 
culled and then exported, melted down, or hoarded; in consequence, only 
debased coins should have remained in circulation. Contemporary 
evidence and modern literature suggest that Gresham’s Law worked at 
least to some extent in mid-Tudor England: apparently coins of the better 
                                                 
8 F. R. Velde, W. E. Weber, and R. Wright, ‘A Model of Commodity Money, with 
Applications to Gresham’s Law and the Debasement Puzzle’, Review of Economic 
Dynamics, Vol. 2, (1999), pp. 291-323. 
9 O. J. Volckart, ‘”The Big Problem of the Petty Coins”, and How it Could be Solved in 
the Late Middle Ages’, Working Paper in Economic History, LSE, 2008, p.21.  
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standard fineness did become scarce.10 The disappearance of fine coins 
is not in doubt, but to what extent were these coins wiped out by the 
appearance of debased currency? How quickly were they withdrawn from 
circulation? How far can Gresham’s Law explain this? Before providing 
answers to these questions, a review of the historical background is 
necessary.  
 
 
The Great Debasement 
Since the High Middle Ages, English coins had long enjoyed a good 
reputation for stability and fineness, and had for centuries been widely 
accepted on the Continent. Parliament had for a long time strongly 
defended the inviolable standard of the coinage (which was that silver and 
gold coins had a pureness of 92.5 percent and 99.48 percent respectively), 
and was reluctant to devalue it.11 However, when Henry VIII faced huge 
expenses in wars against France and Scotland, and after other resources 
were exhausted, he had no choice but to debase his coinage. His son, 
Edward VI, carried on another further adulteration before endeavouring to 
restore the standard. During the whole period of the debasements (eight 
years), the fine metallic content of silver coins had been reduced by 83 
percent and gold coins by 27 percent (Fig. I). The scale of the debasement 
                                                 
10 C. W. C. Oman, ‘The Tudors and the Currency, 1526-1560’, Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, Vol. 9 (1895), p. 184; C. H. Challis, The Tudor Coinage 
(Manchester University Press, 1978), p. 116; R. Ruding, Annals of the Coinage of Great 
Britain and Its Dependencies (London, 1840, 3d ed.), volume I, p. 334. 
11 A statute of 1352 made it illegal for any monetary alteration without the consent of 
Parliament. A. E. Feaveryear, The Pound Sterling (Oxford University Press, 1963), p.30; 
C. M. Cipolla, ‘Currency Depreciation in Medieval Europe’, The Economic History 
Review, New Series, Vol. 15, No. 3, (1963), pp. 420-1. 
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was so large and unprecedented that it was a shock after centuries of 
stable coinage and had a far-reaching impact on monetary policy for the 
next two centuries.12 In the history of money, the monetary adulteration 
experienced from 1544 to 1551 in England has been called the Great 
Debasement. 
 
Fig.1: Changes in the monetary standards, gold and silver (index, 1520-24=1.00)
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The debasement occurred in several stages. In 1544 Henry VIII 
reduced the fineness of silver and gold coins to 75 percent and 95.83 
percent respectively. Later the fineness of silver coins was further reduced 
to 50 percent and that of gold coins to 91.66 percent. Despite the 
debasements, royal finances were still in deep trouble. In late 1548, the 
                                                 
12 Although there had been several debasements in the previous three centuries, the 
scale of adulteration either in weight or in fineness had never been seen before. Henry 
VIII and his successor were able to extract approximately £1,285,000 during the Great 
Debasement, C. E. Challis, ‘The Debasement of the Coinage, 1542-1551’, Economic 
History Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1967), p. 453.The experience of the Great Debasement 
played a role in 1696 re-coinage which decided on retaining the old standard fineness 
rather than reducing the fineness standard. 
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supply of silver to the mint started to dry up, and the King remained in 
financial difficulty. Now the mint price was too low to attract any more 
bullion to the mint, the government had no choice but to force people to 
surrender coins issued earlier by means of re-coinage. Edward VI 
withdrew the base testoons (twelve-penny) issued since the openness of 
the debasement (i.e. the silver coins of 75, 50 and 33.3 percent purity) and 
re-coined it into coins either of the old weight but with lower fineness, or of 
the same fineness but with lower weight.13 In April 1551, in the last stage 
of the Great Debasement, the fineness of silver coins had plummeted to 
25 percent, and the pure silver content was only about 17 percent of that 
of the pre-debasement coins. 
Before Edward VI restored the fineness standard to 92 percent in 
October 1551, it is possible that two types of silver coin dominated in 
circulation: the ones containing 51.84 grams pure silver per pound sterling; 
the other being the basest coins issued from April 1551 which only 
contained 25.92 grams of silver per pound sterling. In August 1551, all 
debased silver coins were devalued to half their previous face values. 
Even so, the prevalent mint price between the end of the Great 
Debasement and the eve of Elizabeth’s restoration was unable to attract 
                                                 
13 The re-coinage of 1548-9 was devised against the background of a stagnating supply 
of bullion. As before, it was justified under the pretext of countering counterfeiting: “what 
fraud and corruption hath of late time been used in the falsing of his highness’s coin now 
current, specially of the pieces of 12d…for the greatness and facility of 
counterfeiting…the practicers whereof (as is known) are not only men here dwelling, but 
also for the most part have been strangers dwelling in foreign parts who have found the 
means to convey privily and disperse the said counterfeit piece abroad.” P. L. Hughes 
and J. F. Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, (1964), Volume 1, No. 302, p. 420. Silver 
coins of three different kinds of fineness but the same mint equivalent were issued over 
the re-coinage of 1548-9: (1) those of 66.67 percent fineness, (2) those of 50 percent 
fineness, and (3) those with 33.33 percent fineness. Challis, The Tudor Coinage, 
Appendix II, p. 306. 
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the remaining base money to the mint (Table II).14 After halving the face 
value, the remaining base silver coins roughly contained 90 percent as 
much pure silver as those fine coins issued later in the reign of Edward VI 
and during that of Mary. Debased coins and good coins circulated 
side-by-side during this period. The situation did not change very much 
until Elizabeth‘s restoration. Until the face value of base money was 
further reduced, the government could not afford a viable reform of the 
coinage.  
 
 
Testing Gresham’s Law 
As mentioned earlier, knowledge plays a pivotal role in Gresham’s 
Law: when the information costs are high, the line between good money 
and bad money cannot be easily drawn. Therefore, the concept of well- 
and less-informed agents in VWW’s model is applied here to examine 
Gresham’s Law during the Great Debasement. Two types of consumer 
can be distinguished in mid-sixteenth-century England: a minority group 
composed of merchants, goldsmiths, money changers, and other 
professionals and tradesmen, and the rest of the population, i.e. in 
Bedford’s words, ‘thunlerned and unplandyshe people’.15 It is reasonable 
                                                 
14 A few debased coins of 50 percent fineness issued between 1545-7 likely survived in 
circulation by the autumn of 1551. A part of debased coins of 50 percent fineness had 
been re-coined in 1548-9, and a part had been withdrawn to mint the basest coins in the 
early 1551. However, the mint price was unable to bring silver coins of 50 percent 
fineness to the mint until April 1551 (Table I). After the revaluation of 1551, the mint price 
(£3.2) was significantly higher than the mint equivalent of these coins (£2.4). The silver 
coins of 50 percent fineness seems likely to be wiped out of circulation before 
Elizabeth’s re-coinage. J. D. Gould, The Great Debasement (Oxford, 1970), pp. 47-8.  
15 During the Elizabethan re-coinage, for example, the Earl of Bedford complained to 
the Lord Treasurer, William Cecil, that ‘thunlerned and unplandyshe people’ had 
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to regard the former as the well-informed agent who was in a better 
position to identify the intrinsic value of coins because of its greater 
resources and information, and the latter as the less-informed agent.16  
Theoretically, people could calculate the intrinsic value of coins by 
multiplying the weight of coins by their fineness. However, the touchstone 
test - the common technology used to identify the fineness of coins in the 
early modern period - was accurate at best only to within two or three 
percentage points17 and required a great deal of specialized knowledge 
and instrument.18 This implies that for many consumers, the transaction 
costs of determining the intrinsic value of coins must have been prohibitive. 
Therefore, the general public likely handled coins by tale. On the other 
hand, merchants involved with large transactions especially in 
international trade and the government valued coins on their intrinsic value 
(that is, by weight).19  
The two types of evidence used here to examine the efficacy of 
Gresham’s Law during the Great Debasement, the composition of 
                                                                                                                                               
difficulty in drawing a distinction between the 50 percent and 25 percent fineness silver 
coins, and officers had been sent to counties to put different stamps upon the two types 
of coins. A portcullis was stamped on the less debased coins in front of the King’s head 
and on the basest coins a greyhound behind it. D. M. Palliser, The Age of Elizabeth 
(London: Longman, 1992), p. 135; J. Graig, The Mint (Cambridge, 1953), p.119. 
16 C. H. Challis, ‘The Circulating Medium and the Movement of Prices in Mid-Tudor 
England’, The Price Revolution in Sixteenth-Century England, ed. by P. E. Ramsey, 
(Methuen, 1971), pp. 139-40.  
17 N. Gandal and N. Sussman, loc. cit., p. 444. Around the mid-fourteenth century, 
however, in Venice, the needles used in the touchstone test could be accurate to within 
a few thousandths of a percentage point (though the authors express a degree of 
skepticism). F. C. Lane and R. C. Mueller, Money and Banking in Medieval and 
Renaissance Venice (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 150. 
18 Although the cost of the touchstone test is unknown, we know the price of the 
balance and the set of coin weights in Elizabeth’s reign: from 54d to 37d (when the 
wage of a master mason was 7d daily in the 1550s). A Declaration of an order for the 
making of certaine small Cases of for Ballaunces and Waightes to weigh all maner of 
Golde Coynes (1588), in H. Dyson; Proclamations (1618), p. 258.  
19 Lane and Mueller maintain that the general population passed coins by tale; 
merchants, on the other hand, handled coins by weight. Lane and Mueller, op. cit., p. 
59-60. 
 - 11 -
Elizabeth’s re-coinage and the movement of the exchange rate, 
correspond respectively to the situations of less-informed and 
well-informed agents. Although gold and silver coins were both involved in 
the Great Debasement, gold coins will not be considered in the evidence 
drawn from Elizabeth’s re-coinage partially because gold coins suffered 
less adulteration than silver during the Great Debasement and the 
standard of gold coins had been restored in Edward’s reign, and partially 
because gold coins were not re-coined in Elizabeth’s reform. As the 
common medium of exchange used in international trade, however, gold 
coins play a critical part in the evidence drawing from the movement of 
exchange rates.  
 
i. Re-coinage 
In October 1551, the government began to restore the standard of 
silver coins by calling down the face value of debased coins20 and issuing 
fine silver coins. The fine silver coins were struck at 60 shillings per pound 
of pure silver with 92.08 percent fineness, which was slightly lower than 
the old standard (92.5 percent fineness). The revaluation of debased silver 
coins in 1551 was the first step toward the restoration of the old standard. 
However, the revaluation failed to provide enough incentives to re-mint the 
remaining debased coins (Table II).21 In Mary’s reign the fineness of silver 
                                                 
20 The face values of base silver coins were all reduced by 25 percent, with the testoon 
and groat becoming 9d (instead of 12d) and 3d (instead of 4d) pieces respectively from 
August. One and half months later, the shilling was called down once again to 6d, the 
groat to 2d and the smaller coins in the same proportion. Tudor Royal Proclamations, 
No. 372, 378, and 379. 
21 The mint equivalent of debased coins (£3.6000 and £7.2000) was still higher than the 
mint price of the fine silver coins issued from October 1551 (£3.2000) (Table II). 
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coins was slightly reduced to 91.66 percent. When Elizabeth came to the 
throne in 1558, four types of silver coins remained in circulation: those of 
50 percent fineness issued in 1549-51, of 33 percent fineness issued in 
1546-50, the basest coins of 25 percent fineness issued in 1551, and the 
fine silver coins issued after the Great Debasement.  
According to Gresham’s Law, debased silver coins with less intrinsic 
value should drive fine silver coins of 1551-60 out of circulation. Many 
scholars assume that this was what actually happened. For example, 
according to Oman, ‘the copious stream of finer pieces [that] poured out 
from the mint […] seemed to vanish just as it touched the trading world’.22 
But he provided neither statistics nor an explanation to support his 
argument. Feavearyear had a similar opinion about the disappearance of 
Edward VI’s and Mary’s fine silver coins: ‘new ones [fine silver coins] 
which immediately disappeared’; and ‘the price of silver was much too 
high to permit coins as fine and as heavy as his new ones to stay in 
circulation’.23 Contemporaries also showed the same concern: Sir John 
Price told Queen Mary ‘…as one testoon is better than another, the fine 
new coin better than the base universally … which inequality is cause of 
much robbing of the treasure of the realm, while the best money is ever 
picked and carried over, and the worst only left us’.24 Nevertheless Gould 
argues, based on Stanley’s estimation,25 that “a large part of the fine-gold 
and sterling-silver coinages of the last years of Edward VI and of Mary’s 
                                                 
22 Oman, op. cit., p. 184. 
23 Feavearyear, op. cit., p.66 and 69. 
24 W. A. J. Archbold, ‘A Manuscript Treatise on the Coinage by John Pryse, 1553’, 
English Historical Review, (1898), pp.709-10. 
25 Thomas Stanley was a senior mint official, and controlled the mint from 1551 to 1571. 
He also charged Elizabethan re-coinage in the old mint in the Tower. 
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reign [to have] survived to 1559’, calling Gresham’s Law into doubt.26  
In order to solve the question of the accuracy of Gresham’s Law in 
describing events after the Great Debasement, it is necessary to calculate 
how much base money had been produced since the start of the Great 
Debasement, what proportion of it was then melted down or converted, 
and what proportion of the rest of the debased coins of different standards 
was still current between the end of the debasement and the re-coinage of 
1560. Moreover, questions such as how much fine silver money was 
issued during this period, and how many of these coins still circulated on 
the eve of the re-coinage also need to be answered. If bad money did 
drive out good money, the number of fine silver coins in circulation on the 
eve of Elizabeth’s re-coinage should be significantly smaller than the total 
output of fine silver. The discrepancy between these two figures can be 
used to assess the effectiveness of Gresham’s Law.  
In the preparation for the re-coinage, the government had to have a 
basic understanding about the composition of circulation, and to revalue 
the debased coins. Therefore, in 1559 Stanley conducted his estimate of 
the characteristics of coinage in circulation in 1559 (Table III). Later in 
1560 the government reduced the face value of lesser debased silver 
coins (50 percent and 33.33 percent fineness) to 4 1/2d, which amounted 
to a reduction of 25 percent, and the basest ones (25 percent fineness) to 
2 1/4d, which represented a 62.5 percent drop in the face value (Table II, 
column 5).27 
                                                 
26 Gould, op. cit., p.55.  
27 Proclamations, No. 471. 
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The change in the number of fine silver after the Great Debasement 
can be obtained from the comparison between Stanley’s estimate and the 
total output of fine silver issued from 1551 to 1558. However, the mint 
accounts of 1551-8 are fragmentary. Over these eight years, only thirty 
months’ accounts survive: Oct. 1551-Mar. 1552, Dec. 1553-Dec. 1555. 
Because of this discontinuity, the calculation of the total output has to rely 
heavily on the estimate of 1556 privy council and the first year output of 
Elizabeth’s reign (Table IV).28   
The gold and fine silver coins issued under the name of Edward VI 
surviving in circulation in 1559 amounted to ₤100,000 in Stanley’s 
estimate (Table III, row 3), which was ₤45,332 short of the total mint 
output (£145,332 17s 6d, Table IV, column 4). If this discrepancy had 
entirely been due to the disappearance of fine silver coins, 36.5 percent 
(£45,332 out of £124,179), at most, of Edwardian fine silver disappeared 
during this period. Did Mary’s fine silver suffer the same rate of attrition? 
Since mint accounts from the second part of Mary’s reign (1556-8) are 
missing, the output of these years needs to be reconstructed in order to 
extrapolate the rate of disappearance of fine silver.  
Mary’s marriage to Philip of Spain in July 1554 boosted the supply 
of bullion to England. Craig describes the brisk activity of the mint: 
                                                 
28 The estimates of the first two rows are drawn from the study of Challis and Harrison. 
The estimates of the third row will be explained below in detail. Challis and Harrison, 
lbid., p. 831 
 - 15 -
‘Twenty carts of bullion drawn by ninety-nine horse and two wagons 
of foreign coin lumbered into the Mint…reinforced by men and tools from 
Spain, it re-minted nearly ₤17,600 of Spanish ryals.’29  
The mint output of the first year of Elizabeth’s reign probably offers a 
better proxy for the missing accounts of July 1556-January 1559 than the 
inflated mint output of the early part of Mary’s reign. The mint was likely to 
have been idle during the latter part of Mary’s reign;30 therefore, the mint 
output of the first year of Elizabeth’s reign (which was two-fifths of the mint 
output of the early part of Mary’s reign) can be seen as the maximum 
estimated output. Between January 1559 and July 1560, the output of gold 
and silver was £25,636 and £31,312 respectively.31 Therefore, the 
estimates have assumed £37,779 of gold coins and £46,144 of fine silver 
coins should be added to Mary’s mint output, to arrive at an estimated total 
output for her reign of ₤379,016 (Table IV, row 3).32 Comparing this figure 
to Stanley’s estimate, which was ₤370,000, the discrepancy between them 
is ₤9,016. As for the case of Edwardian fine silver, that the shortfall of 
₤9,016 was due to the loss of fine silver coins, only 3.4 percent of Mary’s 
fine silver vanished from circulation, and that figure increased to 4.2 
percent when there would have been no mint output late in Mary’s reign. 
If (1) these estimates are broadly correct,33 and (2) the difference 
                                                 
29 Craig, op. cit., p.118. 
30 Gould, op. cit., p. 53. Challis, however, argues that there may be modest mint output 
during the second part of Mary’s reign. Challis, 'A Contemporary Estimate of the 
Production of Silver and Gold Coinage’, p.832. 
31 Challis, A New History of Royal Min (Cambridge University Press, 1992), AppendixⅠ 
2. 
32 The average monthly mint output during the period Jan. 1559-July 1560 was £1,648 
in silver and £1,349 in gold. Therefore, the estimated mint output from Aug. 1556 to Nov. 
1558 (28 months) is £46,144 in silver and £37,779 in gold. 
33 There are good grounds for trusting these estimates. As a senior mint official and a 
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between the estimated total output of fine silver coins and Stanley’s 
estimate entirely comes from the disappearance of fine silver coins, the 
above calculation suggests that 14 percent of good money had 
disappeared in the period between the end of the Great debasement and 
the Elizabeth’s re-coinage.34 Before any conclusion about the validity of 
Gresham’s Law can be drawn from this estimate, a few points need to be 
clarified. First, there is a substantial difference in the disappearance rate of 
fine silver between Edward VI (36.5 percent) and Mary’s time (3.4 - 4.2 
percent). One possible explanation for this is that since Edwardian fine 
silver had been in circulation longer than Marian, it was more exposed to 
culling and hoarding. Moreover, people might still not have felt confident 
about the English coinage over the years following the Great Debasement, 
meaning that the incentive to cull fine silver out of circulation remained 
strong. Once the faith in English currency was restored, the fine silver 
coins were less likely to be hoarded. 
Second, although the fine silver coins issued during 1551-8 did not 
return to the pre-debasement standard, the fineness of silver coins had 
been largely improved. The public were not able to benefit from hoarding 
fine silver coins in that the standard of English sterling was more or less 
restored, and the production of fine silver coins seemed likely to be 
continuous. There was no other new debased coins produced to compete 
                                                                                                                                               
mint master from 1560-72, Stanley’s estimate should be quite accurate. Gould, op. cit., 
pp. 54-5. For analysis of the estimate of 1556 see C. E. Challis and C. J. Harrison, 'A 
Contemporary Estimate of the Production of Silver and Gold Coinage in England, 
1542-1556', Economic History Review, 88 (1973), pp. 821-35. 
34 £470,000 (Table III, row 3 and 4) out of ₤524,349 (Table IV, column 4) is 86 percent. If 
the disappearance of gold during this period is included, then the proportion of fine silver 
remaining in circulation will be larger than the 86 percent estimated here. 
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with fine silver coins.35 Third, the revaluation of 1551 reduced the quantity 
of circulating medium in terms of face value by roughly 50 percent.36 The 
loss of half the volume of currency forced the economy to circulate money 
more efficiently. Therefore, the public intended to use every available 
money and were less likely to hoard money (it may be costly to do so).  
Last, the appearance of fine silver coins was very different from the 
debased coins (especially Mary’s). There is little doubt that even the 
ordinary people were able to distinguish fine silver coins from the debased. 
The lower is the information cost, the more likely it is that money with 
different qualities can circulate side by side. Based on these factors, the 
disappearance of 14 percent of total fine silver coins can not imply that 
Gresham’s Law was only valid to a limited extent. However, the 
disappearance rate of Edward’s fine silver coins can be tentatively 
regarded as a measurement of effectiveness of Gresham’s Law: about 
one third of fine silver coins disappeared from circulation in less than two 
years.  
 
ii Exchange Rate 
In this section, the adjusted par exchange rates will be constructed, 
and the comparison between it and the actual exchange will be used to 
measure the effectiveness of Gresham’s Law during the Great 
                                                 
35 Though the issue of fine silver coins since October 1551, the mints (the Tower mint 
and York) continued to strike small denominations in debased coins (with 33.33 percent 
fineness). However, a rose was engraved on these base coins which appearance was 
different from the fine silver coins. 
36 £2,405,000 out of 2,455,000 total circulating medium in July 1551 was debased silver. 
The revaluation of 1551 resulted in halving the money, in terms of face value, in 
circulation. Challis, ‘The Circulating Medium’, op. cit., p. 132. 
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Debasement. Because merchants’ reaction toward the monetary alteration 
was reflected in the movement of exchange rates, the difference between 
the actual rates and the theoretical rates will shed some light on how 
merchants responded to the various standards of coins resulted from the 
debasements. 
As early as the thirteenth century, the bill of exchange was devised 
to alleviate the costs involved in shipping bulky commodity money, either 
in the form of bullion or coin, to settle commercial payments or debts.37 By 
using bills of exchange, the only need to settle international payments by 
shipping specie was to cover imbalances of trade, which greatly reduced 
the transaction costs, i.e. the seigniorage derived from manual currency 
exchange,38 and the risks of delay, piracy, and confiscation inherent in 
transporting specie. English merchants who needed Flemish money, for 
instance, to import Portuguese spice from Antwerp, could simply buy a bill 
of exchange with English money in London and redeem it into Flemish 
currency in Antwerp, whereas those with Flemish money could buy a bill of 
exchange which would be paid in pounds sterling later in London. The bill 
of exchange saved the trouble of shipping specie and consequently 
boosted international trade.  
How was the exchange rate of bills decided? Exchange fluctuations 
                                                 
37A series of studies by Raymond de Roover comprehensively explain the origination 
and the mechanism of the bills of exchange. Raymond de Roover, Gresham on Foreign 
Exchange (Cambridge, 1949); idem., Money, Banking and Credit in Medieval Bruge, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1948), p. 51-75; idem., ‘What is dry exchange? A 
contribution to the study of English Mercantilism’, Business, Banking, and Economic 
thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Selected Studies of Raymond de 
Roover, ed. by Julius Kirshner, (University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 183-99. 
38 Feavearyear (op. cit., appendix I and II) estimates that the mint charge in England 
varied from 2.5 to 12 percent on silver coins; from 0.6 to 12 percent on gold coins. 
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in the mid-sixteenth century were the result of forces operating in the 
money market. Apart from the supply and demand of bills of exchange in 
the market, according to de Roover, the principal causes of such 
fluctuations were: (1) changes in the metallic content of coins either at 
home or abroad through enhancement or debasement; (2) changes in the 
balance of trade; (3) manipulation of the money market by governments, 
and the speculation.39 For examining the validity of Gresham’s Law during 
the Great Debasement; however, the impact of the mint parity on 
exchange rates of bills outweighs other factors.40 The relative price of 
domestic money in terms of foreign currency is to a large extent 
determined by the ratio of metallic content of the two currencies. In other 
words, the exchange rate between two countries reflects the intrinsic value 
of their coinage. When there is a monetary alteration in either country, 
ceteris paribus, the exchange rate should adjust to take account of the 
alteration.  
During the Great Debasement - when the metallic content of English 
silver coins had deteriorated by 83 percent, but the metallic content of the 
Flemish groat was unchanged between 1527 and 155341 - according to 
the mint parity the exchange rate for one English pound should have 
                                                 
39 de Roover, Gresham on Foreign Exchange, p.128. 
40 Although Gresham tried to manipulate the exchange rates to favour English sterling, 
his endeavour was short-lived and did not achieve anything. The seasonal fluctuations 
were very predictable and did not alter the fundamental trend of exchange rates. We are 
unable to measure the overall English trade balance; however, the trade balance with 
her main trade partner, the Low Countries, was estimated to be negative and stable. P. 
A. M. Boele van Hensbroeck, Lodovico Guicciardini, Descrittione di Tutti i Paesi Bassi, 
Bibliografische studie, Bijdragen en Mededelingen Historisch Genootschap Utrecht, I, 
1877; W. Brulez, ‘The balance of Trade of the Netherlands in the Middle of the 16th 
Century’, Acta Historiae Neerlandica,IV, 1970, pp.20-48; Stone, L., ‘Elizabethan 
Overseas Trade’, Economic History Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, (1949), pp. 30-58. 
41 Although the metallic content of Flemish silver coins remained unchanged, the 
government enhanced the face value of gold coins in 1548 and 1551.  
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reached 4s 6d Flemish to reflect the depreciated value of English coins 
being struck at their time (Table V).42 However, the London-Antwerp 
exchange rate only reached its nadir at 12s 9d in July 1551.43 Although the
impact of the Great Debasement on exchange rates is indubitable, it is not 
enough to explain changes in the exchange rate solely by changes in the 
mint parity. As Challis points out, it ‘…was wrong to embrace a purely 
mechanistic interpretation of exchange movements, linking as he [Unwin] 
did falling exchanges directly with adulteration of the coinage’.
 
                                                
44 Could the 
connection between the mint parity and exchange rates be improved by 
considering merchants’ reactions to the various standards of coins? The 
type of coin used to settle bills of exchange definitely had an impact on the 
exchange rate, therefore, the difference between the actual exchange 
rates and the par exchange rates could thus be used to test whether bad 
money drove out good money during the Great Debasement. If Gresham’s 
Law was valid, then debased coins rapidly became the dominating 
circulating medium in England during this period, and the exchange rate in 
London would have declined to an extent fully corresponding to the 
metallic content of English debased coins. The effectiveness of Gresham’s 
Law can therefore be examined by analyzing the movement of the 
exchange rates of London-Antwerp.45 
 
42 The exchange rate would have reached its nadir at 19s 8d in 1546, if the trade of the 
bill of exchange had been paid in gold coins. The gold coins issued in 1546 only 
contained 10.368 grams in one pound sterling, at the meantime, the Flemish gold coins 
contained 10.55 grams in one Flemish pound. Therefore, the mint parity in terms of gold 
coins between England and the Low Countries was 19s 8d (without considering the 
seigniorage and the transport cost). 
43 Gould, op. cit., p. 89. The list of exchange rates is presented in Appendix. 
44 C. E. Challis, ‘Currency and the Economy in Mid-Tudor England’, Economic History 
Review, Vol. 25, No.2 (1971), pp. 313-22. 
45 The exchange rates used here are from: (1) Gould, The Great Debasement, Table IX; 
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Figure II: The London-Antwerp Exchange Rates, 1544-61
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Transactions of bills of exchange were strictly monitored in England, 
and merchants were required to obtain a license to use bills of 
exchange.46 Inevitably the way these merchants handled coins during the 
debasement had a great impact on the movement of exchange rates. But 
what kinds of coins were used to settle international payment? Gold or 
silver? Good money or bad money? Since Europe was a bimetallic 
economy in the sixteenth century, if the transaction was not through a 
deposit banker, the bill of exchange could be paid either in silver or gold 
                                                                                                                                               
(2) T. H. Lloyd, ‘Early Elizabethan Investigations into Exchange and the Value of Sterling, 
1558-1568’, Economic History Review, 2000, Table 2; (3) P. H. Ramsay, The Merchant 
Adventurers in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century, Unpublished PhD thesis, Oxford: 
University of Oxford, 1958, Appendix D.  
46 In 1531 the government issued a proclamation which revived an old statue of 1381 
and forbade merchants from making exchanges and re-changes without the king’s 
license. De Roover, Gresham on Foreign Exchange, p.181. 
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coins.47 Although gold is known to have played an important role in 
international payment, there is no way to know which metal was actually 
used. The metal used in the payment of bills of exchange is particularly 
important for calculating the mint parity in the Great Debasement when 
gold and silver suffered different degrees of adulteration. During the 
pre-debasement period, the mint parity of either gold or silver was close to 
the actual exchange rates of bills.48 However, as shown in Fig. II, a 
significant difference existed between these rates.  
In 1541 Charles V decreed that bills of exchange and bonds should 
be settled with a minimum of two-thirds in recognized gold specie in the 
Low Countries.49 This silver/gold ratio can be regarded as a proxy in 
constructing the par exchange rate.50 Besides the issue of the type of 
metal used in settling bills of exchange, the standard of Flemish coinage 
poses another problem in calculating the mint parity. Unlike English 
Sterling, Flemish money did not have a single fineness standard, but the 
fineness varied from between denominations. For example, a Double 
                                                 
47 Hanham, A., The Celys and Their World (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 179, 193. 
48 The mint parity during this period was 26.84 Flemish shilling to the pound Sterling for 
silver coins and 26.07 for gold coins. The exchange rates presented in van der Wee’s 
graph indicate that the exchange rates of bills varied between 26.5 and 27.25 Flemish 
shillings to one pound sterling. Van der Wee, H., The Growth of the Antwerp Market and 
the Europe Economy, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), Graph 32. 
49 The decree aimed to increase the amount of gold in the Low Countries, but it 
blockaded the use of credit and delivered a blow to commerce in the Low Countries. 
And very soon it was effectively allowed to lapse. F. Edler, “The Effect of the Financial 
Measures of Charles V on the Commerce of Antwerp, 1539-42,” Revue Belge de 
Philogoie et d’Historie, Vol. 16, (1937), pp. 671-3; R. De Roover, Money, Banking and 
Credit in Medieval Bruges p. 81. Furthermore, Buckley argues that “the prevalence of 
bad money led the Flemish […] to stipulate for payment of bills of exchange and 
repayment of loans in permission money; two-thirds in gold and one-third in silver.” H. 
Buckley, ’Sir Thomas Gresham and the Foreign Exchanges,’ The Economic Journal, Vol. 
34, No. 136, (1924), p. 590. 
50 Gold was commonly used as a medium of exchange for large payments and 
overseas trade; furthermore, it suffered less adulteration compared to silver during the 
great debasement (Fig. I). But the increasing circulation of silver coins in 
mid-sixteenth-century England can not be neglected. Challis, The Tudor Coinage, table 
3, p. 232. The gold/silver ratio of 2 to 1 seems reasonable.  
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Carolus valued at 6d, had 0.934 fineness, whereas a Carolus with a face 
value of 3d consisted of 0.457 silver.51 The difference in fineness could be 
a result of the production cost, in that it was more expensive to produce 
small denomination coins than large denomination coins. Therefore, the 
type of Flemish coin used in settling bills affects the calculation of the mint 
parity between England and the Low Countries. Because the transaction 
costs of using coins with larger denominations is lower (it takes less effort 
to count the number of coins involved in a transaction), it is reasonable to 
assume here that in the Low Countries bills of exchange were remitted in 
coins of the largest denomination. Therefore the Double Carolus (the 
silver coin with the face value of 6d) and Real d’or (the gold coin with the 
face value of 10s) are chosen to calculate the mint parity between the two 
countries.  
When good coins and base coins were in circulation, as in the case 
of the Great Debasement, merchants, being well-informed agents, were 
probably able to distinguish between them (p. 12 f.). In international trade, 
English merchants and foreign merchants were both well-informed; the 
debased coins could thus circulate at a discount and good (less debased) 
coins at a premium. When two parties involved in trade are both 
well-informed, Gresham’s Law, which requires asymmetric information, 
fails to apply. However, this is a counter-effect. Considering the higher 
transaction cost involved in dealing with debased coins (i.e. the time 
consumed in counting and examining a larger number of debased coins, 
                                                 
51 Pusch, Gottfried, 1932, Staatliche Münz- und Geldpolitik in den Niederlanden unter 
den burgundischen und habsburgischen Herrschern besonders unter Kaiser Karl V. Val. 
Höfling, München, p. 48. 
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and less certainty and confidence in the new debased coins), merchants 
involved in international trade were inclined to use good (less debased) 
coins.  
The old (good) coins would remain in circulation until the mint price 
of new (debased) coins was higher than the mint equivalent of old ones, 
thus merchants would keep using them to settle bills of exchange. 
Therefore, the adjusted par exchange rates are constructed from the less 
debased coins in circulation, and the gold/silver ratio of 2 to 1 (Table VI). 
For example, until 1547, the mint price was higher than the mint equivalent 
of the silver coins issued in 1544 (Table I), therefore merchants are 
assumed to have used silver coins of 1544 to settle bills of exchange, 
although the baser silver coins, which had 50 percent fineness, were 
available from 1545. On the other hand, the par exchange rates are 
calculated using the last debased coins and the same gold/silver ratio. 
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Figure III: The Adjusted Par Exchange Rates, 1544-61
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As shown in Figure III, the adjusted par exchange rates generally 
correspond more closely to the actual trend of exchange rates than the par 
exchange rates; nevertheless, the actual exchange rates were always 
higher than the adjusted par exchange rates, except in 1551. There are a 
few aspects of Fig. III that require clarification. First of all, there is a time 
lag between the actual and the adjusted par exchange rates during the 
debasement. The time lag was about three years in the early stages of the 
debasement (before the re-coinage of 1549), and roughly one and half 
years after the re-coinage of 1549, when the pure silver content was 
adulterated by a further 33 per cent. After the Great Debasement (1551-3) 
the actual exchange rate did not immediately rebound from its previous 
plunge; it took about 20 months to climb back to the level which 
corresponds the intrinsic value between English and Flemish coins. It took 
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time for merchants to realize that it was profitable to exchange old coins 
for debased coins, and through this, old (good) coins gradually 
disappeared from circulation. This can partially explain the time lapse 
between the adjusted par exchange rates and the actual exchange rates. 
The speed of the spillover effect on monetary policy was approximately 
one and half years in early modern England. Nevertheless, the relatively 
slow reaction of exchange rates to the monetary shock contradicts 
contemporary complaints about the lower price being offered for English 
coins in the Low Countries, just a few months after the initiation of the 
debasement.52 
Second, the most substantial difference between the par exchange 
rates and the adjusted exchange rates appeared between 1547 and the 
re-coinage of 1549. Although by 1547, the metallic content of debased 
silver coins had reached 51.84 grams per one pound Sterling, the previous 
debased silver coins bearing Henry VIII’s name which metallic content 
varied from 111.64 grams to 77.76 grams per one pound Sterling still 
remained in circulation (Table I). The close correspondence between the 
adjusted par exchange rates and the actual exchange rates suggests that 
merchants were inclined to trade with less debased coins.  
Third, in the last stage of the Great Debasement (between April and 
August of 1551) the actual exchange rates were lower than the adjusted 
par exchange rates and the par exchange rates. The probable explanation 
is likely to lie in the outflow of gold from 1549 onward when the gold-silver 
                                                 
52 Feavearyear, op. cit., p.51; Gould, op. cit., p.96. 
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ratio reached its nadir.53 As a result, gold started to disappear from 
circulation in England, therefore, merchants were forced to pay bills of 
exchange in debased silver coins more often than previously. Furthermore, 
this period was the most severe event of the Great Debasement: the 
metallic content of silver coins was 25.92 grams of one pound Sterling 
which was 17 percent of pre-debasement level. These would cause a 
precipitous fall in the exchange rate.  
 Although the relationship between the mint parity and the 
exchange rate is not one-to-one, the mint parity is the main underlying 
element of the fluctuation of the exchange rates during the Great 
Debasement. However, the main determinant of the exchange rates was 
not that dictated by the mint indenture, but by the money actually used to 
settle bills of exchange. In consequence, the efficacy of Gresham’s Law 
(having an effect on this component of circulation) had an impact on the 
degree of the fall in the exchange rate. The effectiveness of Gresham’s 
Law among merchants during the Great Debasement can thus be 
measured by the deviation between the actual exchange rates and the 
adjusted par exchange rates. The result, to some extent, corroborates to 
Rolnick and Weber’s model in which, good money - bearing lower 
transaction costs - could drive out bad money. The closer correspondence 
between the adjusted par exchange rates and the actual exchange rates 
indicates that good money (less base coins) incurred lower transaction 
cost, overwhelming bad money (base coins) in settling the payment of the 
bill of exchange. 
                                                 
53 The gold-silver ratio was 9.3 in July 1550. Gould, op. cit., table VI. 
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Conclusion 
Before the appearance of fiduciary money, rulers were haunted by a 
permanent problem: how to protect their own coinage. Rulers needed to 
prevent excessive adulteration of coinage to avert the outflow of coins. 
Neither could they permit too much undervaluation of their currency 
compared to those of neighbours, as this would attract aggressive 
counterfeiting and thus reduce seigniorage. Through debasement and 
enhancement, rulers could adjust their coinage to correspond to their 
neighbours’. The Great Debasement of 1544-51 was an exceptional case 
in English monetary history, not just for its solely fiscal motive but for the 
scale. At least six different kinds of coin were issued during this period. 
According to Gresham’s Law, when different intrinsic values of coins are 
concurrent in circulation, the low intrinsic value coins drive high intrinsic 
value coins out of circulation. Two types of evidence have been employed 
to test the validity of Gresham’s Law: Elizabeth’s re-coinage and the 
movement of exchange rates of bills. As shown above, although on the 
eve of Elizabeth’s restoration 86 percent of the total output of fine silver of 
1551-8 was still circulating side by side with other debased coins, but due 
to the influence of the reducing volume of currency, and the termination of 
debasement, the operation of Gresham’s Law was not effective. However, 
it seems possible to suggest that in 18 months one third of Edward VI’s 
fine silver had been driven out of circulation by debased coins. During the 
Great Debasement, the adjusted par exchange rates, which based on the 
currently high intrinsic value of coins, rather than the par exchange rates 
corresponds closer to the actual exchange rates, though with a time lag. 
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This implies that international merchants, as being well-informed agents, 
used good money to settle bills of exchange in order to avoid transaction 
costs. The results confirm that transaction cost and asymmetric 
information were essential factors of the operation of Gresham’s Law in 
mid-sixteenth century England. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 30 -
Appendix 
 
Table I:  English silver coins, 1526-1560 
Grams of pure silver 
Date 
Fineness 
(%) per ₤ sterling 
Mint equivalent (₤) Mint charge (₤) Mint Price (₤) 
Nov. 1526 0.9250  153.4464 2.4333  0.0549  2.3784 
May 1542 0.7583  117.9308 3.1650  0.7650  2.4000 
June 1544 0.7500  116.6400 3.2000  0.6000  2.6000 
Apr. 1545 0.5000  77.7600 4.8000  2.0000  2.8000 
April 1547 0.3333  51.8400 7.2000  4.0000  3.2000 
Oct. 1548 0.3333  51.8400 7.2000  3.8000  3.4000 
Jan. 1549 0.6667  51.8400 7.2000  not given not given
Oct. 1549 0.5000  51.8400 7.2000  3.6000  3.6000 
Apr 1550 0.5000  51.8400 7.2000  2.9000  4.3000 
Aug. 1550 0.5000  51.8400 7.2000  3.2000  4.0000 
Apr 1551 0.2500  25.9200 14.4000  8.4000  6.0000 
Oct. 1551 0.9208  114.5623 3.2583  0.0547  3.2036 
Aug. 1553 0.9166  114.0397 3.2708  0.0776  3.1932 
Aug. 1557 0.9166  114.0397 3.2708  0.0799  3.1909 
Nov. 1560 0.9250  115.0848 3.2417  0.0773  3.1644 
 
Source: (1) C. H. Challis, The Tudor Coinage, (Manchester University Press, 1978), p.171, and Appendix II. (2) 
Mint equivalent is drawn from J. D. Gould, The Great Debasement, (Oxford, 1970), Table I. 
Note: fineness is the metallic content of coinage in terms of percentage. Mint equivalent is the face value of 
coins made out of one pound of silver. Mint charge is the amount deducted to cover production costs and 
seigniorage. After the mint charge has been deducted from the mint equivalent, mint price is the amount 
received by the public for bringing in one pound of silver. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 31 -
Table II The variation in denominations of English silver coins, 1551-1560 
Mint equivalent (₤) Mint equivalent (₤) Date of 
issue 
Fineness 
Original Mint 
equivalent (₤) Aug. 1551-Sept. 1560 after Sept. 1560 
Mint Price (₤) 
Apr. 1547 0.3333  7.2000 3.6000 2.7000 3.2000 
Oct. 1548 0.3333  7.2000 3.6000 2.7000 3.4000 
Oct. 1549 0.5000  7.2000 3.6000 2.7000 3.6000 
Apr. 1550 0.5000  7.2000 3.6000 2.7000 4.3000 
Aug. 1550 0.5000  7.2000 3.6000 2.7000 4.0000 
Apr. 1551 0.2500  14.4000 7.2000 2.7000 6.0000 
Oct. 1551 0.9208  3.2583 3.2583 3.2583 3.2042 
Aug. 1553 0.9166  3.2708 3.2708 3.2708 3.1917 
Aug. 1557 0.9166  3.2708 3.2708 3.2708 3.1896 
Nov. 1560 0.9250  3.2417   3.1604 
Note: original mint equivalent and mint price are drawn from Table I. In the second half of 1551, the face 
value of debased silver coins was halved; therefore, the mint equivalents of these coins are reduced by 
the same proportion (column 4). In 1560, the government further reduced the face value of debased coins 
with 0.25 fineness by 62.5 percent and of the other debased coins by 25 percent (column 5). 
 
Table III Stanley's estimate in 1559 
Sovereigns, half-sovereigns, angels, half-angels, and crowns ₤100,000
Spanish rials and pistolets and French crowns ₤50,000
Fine gold and sterling silver coined under EdwardⅥ ₤100,000
Fine gold and sterling silver coined under Mary ₤370,000
Base silver coins ₤1,200,000
  ₤1,820,000
Source: J. D. Gould, The Great Debasement, (Oxford, 1970), p.55. 
 
Table IV:  An estimation of the production of silver and gold coinage, 1551-1558 
  
 
Gold Silver Total 
Edward VI (Mich. 1551-July 1553) ₤21,153 ₤124,179 17s 6d ₤145,332 17s 6d
Mary (July 1553-Juy 1556) ₤78,634 10s ₤216,459 5s ₤295,093 15s
Estimated: Mary (July 1553-Nov. 1558) ₤116,413 10s ₤262,603 5s ₤379,016 15s
Total (Mich. 1551-Nov. 1558) ₤137,566 10s ₤386,783 2s 6d ₤524,349 12s 6d
Sources: C. E. Challis and C. J. Harrison, 'A Contemporary Estimate of the Production of Silver and 
Gold Coinage in England, 1542-1556', Economic History Review, 88 (1973), p.831. 
Note: row 3 = row 2 + the estimated mint output of 1556-8 (see text pp. 16-7). 
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Table V: The par exchange rates in silver 
Date Fineness 
Face value 
per lb 
Pure silver 
content (grams/  
₤ sterling) 
Pure silver 
content (grams/  
₤ Flemish) 
Exchange 
rates (s)  
by par 
1526 0.9250 45s 153.44 26.84  
June 1544 0.7500 48s 116.64 20.40  
Apr. 1545 0.5000 48s 77.76 13.60  
Apr. 1546 0.3300 48s 51.84 9.04  
Apr. 1549 0.5000 72s 51.84 9.04  
Apr. 1551 0.2500 72s 25.92 4.54  
Oct 51-Mar 52 0.9208 60s 114.56 20.04  
Aug. 1553 0.9166 60s 114.04 19.95  
Nov. 1560 0.9250 60s 115.08 
114.32 
20.13  
Source: C. H. Challis, A New History of the Royal Mint, p.235; Pusch, Gottfried, 1932, 
Staatliche Münz- und Geldpolitik in den Niederlanden unter den burgundischen und 
habsburgischen Herrschern besonders unter Kaiser Karl V. Val. Höfling, München. 
 
Table VI: The adjusted par exchange rates 
 
Par exchange rates Par exchange rates Adjusted exchange rates
Date 
better silver better gold (gold :silver = 2:1) 
1526 26.84 26.07 26.33 
June 1544 20.40 23.55 22.50 
Apr. 1546 20.40 21.62 21.21 
July 1548 20.40 20.64 20.56 
Apr .1549 13.60 20.03 17.89 
Oct. 1551-Dec. 1551 20.04 20.53 20.37 
Dec. 1551-Aug. 1553 20.04 21.51 21.02 
Aug. 1553 19.95 21.51 20.99 
Nov. 1560 20.13 21.51 21.05 
Source: see Table V. 
Note: (1) Par exchange rates in gold see Table VII; (2) The figures for column 2 are drawn 
from Table V, column 6; (3) For 1526 and 1551-1560, par exchange rates in gold are 
calculated using the angel (99.48 percent fineness) rather than crown gold (91.66 percent 
fineness). 
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Table VII The par exchange rates in gold 
Face value Pure gold content Pure gold content Exchange rates
Date Fineness 
per lb (grams/ £) (grams/ £Flemish) by par 
1526 0.9948 ₤27 13.752 26.07 
 0.9166 ₤25 2s 6d 13.617 25.81 
June 1544 0.9583 ₤28 16s 12.420 23.55 
Apr 1545 0.9166 ₤30 11.404 21.62 
Apr 1546 0.8333 ₤30 10.368 
10.55 
19.65 
July 1548 0.8333 ₤30 10.374 20.64 
Jan 1549 0.9166 ₤34 10.062 20.03 
Oct. 1551-Dec. 1551 0.9948 ₤36 10.314 20.53 
 0.9166 ₤33 10.367 
10.05 
20.64 
Dec. 1551 0.9948 ₤36 10.314 21.51 
  0.9166 ₤33 10.367 
9.59 
21.62 
Source: see Table V. 
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The Exchange rates of London-Antwerp: 1526-1560 
 
Date 
Flemish shilling 
for one pound 
Sterling  
Date
Flemish shilling 
for one pound 
Sterling 
Date 
Flemish shilling 
for one pound 
Sterling 
1526, Nov. 33.000  1550, Aug. 18.958 1561, Aug. 22.750 
1537, Mar. 26.583  1550, Sept. 18.375 1561, Oct. 22.167 
1537, Apr. 26.500  1550, Oct. 18.000 1561, Nov. 22.438 
1537, May 26.709  1550, Nov. 18.000 1562, Jan. 22.750 
1537, Jun. 26.792  1551, Feb. 16.875 1562, Feb. 23.417 
1537, July 26.917  1551, Apr. 15.250 1562, Mar. 23.250 
1537, Sept. 26.833  1551, June 13.125 1562, Apr. 22.167 
1537, Oct. 27.250  1551, July 12.750 1562, July 22.458 
1544, Jan. 26.667  1551, Aug. 17.833 1562, Aug. 20.459 
1544, Feb. 27.167  1551, Sept. 18.583 1562, Oct. 22.042 
1544, Mar. 26.917  1551, Oct. 19.167 1562, Dec. 22.000 
1544, Apr. 26.667  1551, Nov. 18.667 1563, Jan. 21.833 
1544, May 26.625  1551, Dec. 18.582 1563, Mar. 21.500 
1544, June 25.791  1552, Jan. 17.667 1563, Oct. 21.000 
1544, July 25.667  1552, June 17.582 1563, Nov. 21.000 
1544, Aug. 26.458  1552, July 19.292 1564, Jan. 21.111 
1544, Sept. 26.542  1552, Aug. 19.500 1564, Feb. 21.472 
1544, Oct. 26.792  1552, Dec. 19.458 1564, Mar. 20.833 
1544, Nov. 26.792  1553, Jan. 19.458 1564, Apr. 20.808 
1544, Dec. 25.292  1553, Feb. 19.958 1564, May 21.104 
1545, Oct. 25.375  1553, Apr. 20.167 1564, Jun. 22.333 
1546, Apr. 26.250  1553, Aug. 22.458 1564, July 22.500 
1546, May 25.417  1554, Jan. 20.958 1564, Aug. 22.500 
1546, July 24.500  1554, Feb. 22.458 1564, Sept. 21.787 
1546, Sept. 25.000  1554, Dec. 21.583 1564, Oct. 22.896 
1547, Jan. 23.292  1555, July 21.458 1564, Nov. 23.125 
1547, Feb. 23.375  1555, Oct. 21.292 1564, Dec. 23.000 
1547, Mar. 22.042  1555, Dec. 21.792 1565, Jan. 23.291 
1547, Apr. 22.000  1556, Mar. 21.625 1565, Feb. 23.299 
1547, May 22.208  1556, June 22.500 1565, Mar. 23.146 
1547, June 22.083  1557, Jan. 20.250 1565, Dec. 23.833 
1547, Aug. 22.500  1558, Mar. 21.542 1566, Mar. 23.667 
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1547, Sept. 22.833  1558, Apr. 21.708 1566, May 23.458 
1547, Oct. 22.708  1558, June 22.000 1566, July 23.292 
1547, Nov. 23.042  1558, Nov. 22.292 1566, Aug. 22.917 
1547, Dec. 22.750  1558, Dec. 21.417 1566, Sept. 23.125 
1548, Feb. 22.042  1559, Jan. 21.854 1566, Oct. 22.792
1548, Mar. 21.875  1559, Feb. 22.073 1566, Nov. 23.125 
1548, June 22.292  1559, Mar. 21.833 1566, Dec. 22.667 
1548, July 22.250  1559, Apr. 22.219 1567, Feb. 22.667 
1548, Aug. 22.083  1559, May 21.959 1567, Mar. 22.667 
1548, Sept. 22.000  1559, Jun. 21.958 1567, Apr. 22.722 
1548, Oct. 22.167  1559, July 21.849 1567, May 22.792 
1548, Nov. 22.042  1559, Aug. 21.745 1567, June 22.750 
1548, Dec. 21.292  1559, Sept. 22.250 1567, July 23.328 
1549, Jan. 21.500  1559, Oct. 22.250 1567, Aug. 23.521
1549, Feb. 21.208  1559, Nov. 22.250 1567, Sept. 23.458
1549, Mar. 20.167  1560, Jan. 22.208 1567, Oct. 23.635
1549, Apr. 20.375  1560, Feb. 22.667 1567, Nov. 23.667
1549, May 20.500  1560, Mar. 22.500 1567, Dec. 23.111
1549, June 20.292  1560, Apr. 23.042 1568, Jan. 23.833
1549, July 20.375  1560, May 23.208 1568, Feb. 23.242
1549, Aug. 20.208  1560, July 22.500 1568, Mar. 23.081 
1549, Sept. 20.292  1560, Oct. 23.208 1568, Apr. 23.146 
1549, Oct. 20.125  1560, Nov. 23.000 1568, May 23.250 
1549, Nov. 20.083  1560, Dec. 22.333 1568, June 23.500 
1549, Dec. 19.625  1561, Jan. 20.542 1568, July 23.333 
1550, Apr. 19.375  1561, Mar. 22.167 1568, Aug 23.556
1550, May 20.042  1561, Apr. 22.083 1568, Sept. 22.833
1550, June 19.458  1561, May 21.958 1568, Oct. 22.979
1550, July 19.542  1561, July 23.083    
Sources: (1) J. D. Gould, The Great Debasement, (Oxford, 1970), Table IX; (2) T. H. Lloyd, ‘Early 
Elizabethan Investigations into Exchange and the Value of Sterling, 1558-1568’, Economic History 
Review, 2000, Table 2; (3) P. H. Ramsay, The Merchant Adventurers in the First Half of the Sixteenth 
Century, Unpublished PhD thesis, (University of Oxford, 1958), Appendix D.  
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